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NomeNclature 
Probability framework model
1 2,τ τ  Decision accuracies of the attacker and defender 
player
µ  Probability distribution function
v  Value of the game
ϕ  Probability of successful attack
ω   Probability of unsuccessful attack
δ   Risk assessment parameter
m   Number of interactions in the negotiation game
Belief framework model
i jΑ × Α   
Set of possible actions for the players andi j  
(attacker and defender)
i j
t tπ × π   Payoff function for the players.
( )K
xb , ( )Kxc  
Belief function and confidence function of player x
at level K thinking 
( )N t , ϕ  Number of observation equivalents and attenuation 
coefficient
( )Kλ   Player specific learning speed
*
x
t
a
µ
  
Expected value of player x , for  selecting action.
( )Kθ   
Parameter that controls the sensitivity of probability 
of player x , for  selecting action.
1.  INtroDuctIoN
National critical infrastructure refers to the complex 
underlying delivery and support systems for all large scale 
services considered absolutely essential to a nation1. With 
the widespread implementation of such services on computer 
systems and network infrastructures, protecting its critical 
information has become an important focus for many countries 
across the world. The critical facets of national infrastructure 
sectors range from people, networks to processes, which 
depend on massive information communication technologies 
(ICT), that are considered vital to the normal functioning of 
modern societies and economy. Such systems are vulnerable 
to damage as a result of natural disaster, physical incidents or 
cyber-attacks impacting on critical infrastructure organisations 
managing complex industrial control systems and data 
acquisition systems1-4. Security researchers and administrators 
also sometimes fail to propose appropriate security measures 
toward off attacks. As a consequence, these critical systems 
remain highly vulnerable to unanticipated attacks2-4. Research 
in this emerging area of security in critical infrastructures 
requires a solution methodology, carefully devised by the 
security experts using predetermined processes5,6. One such 
approach is to assess the security of one’s own networks from 
the perspective of an attacker (adversarial modelling) to detect 
the network threats and test the existing security measures. To 
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predict other’s perception of one’s strengths and vulnerabilities, 
applying advanced analytical skills and predicted techniques 
using game theory, machine learning and artificial intelligence 
at tactical level needs to be modelled to understand and capture 
the adversarial nature of the security problem to support decision 
making7-9. To model the cyber-attack-defence scenarios, 
many game models have been proposed in the literature. 
They assume that the players have perfect information about 
the game environment, i.e., the defender being always able 
to detect an attack and the attacker always being aware of 
the employed defence mechanism10-15. however, it has been 
observed that the above assumption about perfect information 
does not hold true in real-world scenarios.
In this paper, we propose game theoretic-based cyber 
warfare test-bed to assess the network security vulnerabilities 
of national critical infrastructure (figs. 1 and 2). A cyber 
warfare interaction scenario is formulated as a game where 
the players (cyber attackers and network defenders) are 
assumed to possess imperfect information about their 
opponents. With the uncertainty about the current status 
of the environment, the players have to strategically plan 
their actions to gain a positive payoff16-19. These attack-
defence scenarios are modelled and exercised on a virtual 
cyber test-bed using modelling and simulation techniques 
to assess and evaluate the vulnerabilities in cyber systems, 
suggest various course of actions and support decisions of 
appropriate actions to be taken by the players. The players’ 
decision making capability is modelled and analysed first 
using a probabilistic framework and then using belief 
functions20. The solution for the games is deduced by 
computing optimal strategies and suggestions on various 
attack-defence strategies for the players. We model the 
behaviour of players and the uncertainties held by them 
about their opponents using a probability framework and 
belief framework. We further explore the interactions of 
the players using negotiation experiments to show that 
the belief framework provides a better representation of 
uncertainties and generates realistically better outcomes than 
the probabilistic framework. These results suggest possible 
course of actions for the players, that they can exercise and 
make decisions under an uncertain environment in various 
cyber war game scenarios. The proposed methodology 
is validated using simulation experiments on the cyber 
warfare test-bed.
2.  DeSIGN of a cyBer WarGameS teSt-
BeD
Cyber war games are designed to examine how 
organisations and critical response teams respond to realistic/
simulated cyber crises and highly skilled adversaries. The war 
game test process is comprised of phases of identification, 
defence, response, and recovery to an attack in depth21-23. This 
is achieved by setting up a cyber test-bed to exercise cyber-
attack scenarios on a network environment as depicted in fig. 2.
2.1  Network Simulation test-bed Design
Designing a cyber test-bed involves the creation of virtual 
network environment to represent the real world systems 
and platforms such as Microsoft Windows, linux, Mac OS, 
Novell Netware and BSD. The network test-bed is setup using 
Windows Virtual Machine and linux Virtual Machine Back 
figure 2. Virtual cyber warfare test-bed design.
figure 1. cyber and physical attacks on national critical infrastructure.
Track version 5 for the results reported in this work. Based 
on the attacker’s objective, a number of attack techniques 
are experimented on the cyber warfare test-bed with the 
aid of sniffers and traffic generators. The attacker site (red 
player) is represented by the use of Metasploit, which 
is an exploit database filled with exploits and payloads 
installed on the back track machine to launch the attacks 
on the Windows host. Metasploit was basically designed to 
help security practitioners’ to find vulnerabilities on their 
networks and fix them, however, this framework is also used 
by the attackers to exploit the vulnerabilities on a network. 
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These exploits are used to break in to the system and payload is 
implemented to produce attack actions on the victim machine. 
Metasploit uses scriptable toolsets like Armitage for adversary 
simulations and red team operations. These toolsets facilitate 
Metasploit around the hacking process for discovery of current 
targets and launch appropriate exploits, post-exploitation and 
manoeuvre24. The victim machine / defender’s system (blue 
player), on the other hand, represent windows virtual machine 
with Wireshark25 installed to monitor the network attacks. The 
goal of the virtual cyber test-bed is to model realistic cyber 
environments to execute and record the attacks and provide 
accurate assessment and evaluation of the vulnerabilities that 
exist in the cyber systems in the real world. This quantifies 
the impact of a cyber intrusion on the operation of underlying 
physical system.
3.  a Game theoretIc aPProach for 
cyBer SecurIty DecISIoN aNalySIS
Although systems are designed against the attacks of 
the highly skilled adversaries, they are still vulnerable to 
cyber threats. Defending against sophisticated antagonists is a 
challenging task which requires not only high technical skills, 
but also a keen understanding of intentions and incentives 
behind their attacks and the different strategies used by them. 
Security decisions are analysed analytically using game theory 
models. Game theory is an effective method to capture the 
nature of adversaries, characterise the impacts of cyber-attacks 
and suggest appropriate security reinforcement mechanism. 
The cyber warfare scenario is formulated as a game, where the 
players (cyber attackers and network defenders) are assumed to 
possess imperfect information about their opponents. Players 
are modelled within the framework of conflict of interest since 
decisions made under imperfect information conditions about 
the opponent could gain a penalty with incorrect beliefs and 
assumptions. faced with this situation of reasoning under 
uncertainty, some additional assumptions are required for a 
clear superior choice to emerge. To illustrate the process, we first 
model the behaviour of players under probabilistic framework 
and then describe how the players’ behaviour, and learning can 
be modelled using belief functions, as an improved framework 
to represent such uncertainties. 
4.  moDellING the DecISIoNS of 
PlayerS uNDer uNcertaINty uSING a 
ProBaBIlIty frameWorK
The term uncertainty in the context of cyber warfare is 
characterised by the ignorance about the game environment, 
scarce, unreliable and conflicting information held by the 
players about their opponents and the inability of the decision 
makers to resolve the set of all possible outcomes.
We model the state of uncertainty of players using a 
probability framework. The decision accuracy of the attacker 
is represented by 1τ  and that defender player is 2τ .The 
attacker chooses an appropriate action with decision accuracy 
1τ  to maximise his attacks while that of the administrator is 
to minimise the attacks by choosing an appropriate action 
with decision accuracy 2τ . The solution of this game can be 
obtained by solving the problem as discussed as follows:
lemma 1: let x and 2τ be optimal, where the attacker 
uses mixed strategy x and the administrator uses a pure strategy
2τ , then 2( , )K x τ = ν , where ν is the value of the game.
Proof: Since x  is optimal, 2( , )K x τ = ν , 2∀ τ  in the 
interval [0,1] . But if 2( , )K x τ had been greater than ν , then this 
inequality would hold for an interval about 2τ . Since 2( , )K x τ = ν
is assumed to be continuous w.r.t both the variables. Integrating
2( , )K x τ = ν , w.r.t. 2( )∂ τ , we obtain the value greater than ν . 
Thus the solution of the game has a probability function where
2 2( , )K x∀ τ τ > ν . This contradicts the assumption that 2τ is 
optimal. Consider a  strategy x° to be an equaliser strategy26 for 
the attacker such that 2( , )K x
° τ yields some constant 2∀ τ , then 
we obtain the following corollaries for this lemma.
corollary 1. If x is a mixed optimal strategy for the 
attacker player, then every optimal strategy for the defender 
player is an equaliser strategy.
corollary 2. If every 1τ , within the interval [0,1] is 
necessary for the attacker player, then every optimal strategy 
for the defender player is an equaliser strategy.
The pair of strategies 1τ and 2τ is said to constitute a solution 
for the game if 1 1 2 12 2( , ) ( , ) ( , ), ,K y K K xτ τ τ τ τ≥ ∀ τ≥ within 
the unit interval [0,1] . 
The attacker’s payoff is formulated as:
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 2
1 1 2 2 2 1
1 2
1 1 1 1
1 2
2 2 1 2 2 1
1 2
,
1 1 1 ,
 
1 1 1 0,
 
1 1 1 ,
 
K
If
If
If
τ τ =
τ + − τ τ − = −τ + + τ τ
 τ < τ
τ − τ + τ − τ − =
 τ = τ
τ − + − τ τ = −τ + − τ τ
 τ > τ
                (1)
Since the players have insufficient knowledge about 
their opponents, it is assumed that the optimality of each 
player is composed of a parameter µ chosen at level °µ , to be 
the probability distribution function over the interval ( , )1µ . 
The value v , of this game is obtained on the interval ( , )1µ  
which is considered as the necessary condition for optimality, 
according to lemma 1. This is possible if the attacker uses a 
mixed strategy x and the administrator uses a pure strategy 2τ . 
The expected payoff for the attacker is
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 2
2 2
2
2
2
2
1
2 1 2 1
0
0
1 2 1 1 2 1
0 0
0
2 2 1 1
1
2 2 1 1
0
2 2 2 2 2
0 1
1 1 2 1
0
0
1
1
0
, ,
, ,
1
1
[ 0 ] 1
1
E x K x
K x K x
x
x
x x
x x
τ =τ −
τ = τ +
τ −
τ +
τ −
τ +
τ = τ τ ∂ τ
= τ τ ∂ τ + τ τ ∂ τ
= −τ + + τ τ ∂ τ  
+ −τ + − τ τ ∂ τ  
= τ τ − τ − − τ + + τ
τ ∂ τ + − τ τ τ∂
∫
∫ ∫
∫
∫
∫ ∫
              
(2)
On considering the parameter µ  chosen at level °µ , to be 
the probability distribution function over the interval ( , )1µ  of 
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the form 
( ) ( )
( )
1 1 1
1 1
, , 1
, ,
x P If
x If
∂ τ = τ µ ≤ τ ≤
∂ τ τ < µ
                         (3)
Then,
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
2 2 1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1
2
2
1
2 2 1 1 1
2
1
1 ,
,
1 ,
P
P
E x
If
P
If
τ
µ
τ
µ

−τ + + τ τ τ ∂τ +


 − τ τ τ ∂ ττ = 
τ ≥ µ

 −τ + − τ τ τ ∂ τ

τ ≤ µ
∫
∫
∫
              
(4) 
The solution of the game has a probability density 
function, 2∀ τ where 2( , ) 0E x τ = ν = , then we must have
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
2
2 2 1 1 1
1
2 1 1 1
1
1 0
P
P
τ
µ
τ
−τ + + τ τ τ ∂ τ +
− τ τ τ ∂ τ =
∫
∫                             
(5)
On differentiating the above expression and further solving 
it we obtain, 3
2
2 )(
C=τ
τ
. Substituting the value of 2( )P τ in the 
Eqn (4), we get
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
1
1 1
2 2 22 2
1 1
1 1 0C C
τ
µ τ
∂ τ ∂ τ
−τ + + τ + − τ =
τ τ∫ ∫              (6)
Thus, 2 1∀ µ ≤ τ ≤ , the above expression yields 
1 1,
3 4
Cµ = = , independent of 2τ .
Thus we have verified that the optimal payoff (in terms 
probability of decision accuracy) for both the players is 1τ with 
the probability density function
3
1 1 1
1 1( ) 1
4 3
,P τ = τ ∀ ≤ τ ≤
                                   
(7)
4.1  learning from observations: a Negotiation 
Game
The behaviour of the players under uncertainty modelled 
using the probabilistic framework is further analysed using a 
cyber-attack scenario illustrated as a negotiation game. here, 
the attacker’s goal is to install a sniffer to crack a root password 
of the system. The defender on the other hand, will detect the 
attack actions and take preventive measures by installing a 
sniffer detector. Consider a situation where the defender is 
working towards defending the system against the attacks of 
cyber adversary by employing two different types of defence 
mechanisms (Type A and Type B). The tactical situation of this 
problem is such that the defender has to choose a right defence 
mechanism to safeguard the system against the attack, while 
attacker has to make an appropriate attack (Type A or Type 
B) on the system by breaking the corresponding defence. If 
the attacks go undetected, then the probability of attacking the 
system is ϕ .But if the defender detects the attack, the attacker 
runs a risk of δ , and the probability of succeeding in the attack 
is (1 )− δ ϕ = ω . 
for m  interactions in the negotiation game, let us 
assume the probability of choosing each type of strategies 
by the player, during each interaction to be the following: 
, , , , , , , ,xΑ = Α Α Α Β Β Β  with 'x sΑ  followed by 
( ) 'm x s− Β . This is done in order to observe the confidence 
with which players make their choices at each interaction. 
The possibilities by which the attacker may fail in each of his 
interaction with the defender is computed using the elements 
( , )a x Α and ( , )a x Β of the ( 1) 2m + × payoff matrix, where 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1, 1 1 1 1x x ma x A −= − − ϕ − ω − ωϕ − ϕ
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1
, 1 1 1
1 1 1
x m x
x m x m x
a x B −
− − −
= − − ϕ − ω −
ω ϕ − ω − ϕ − ω − − ϕ                  (8)
The game considered for this case can be solved, by 
considering concavity in x , where we perform derivative test 
for the concavity of the function for a single variable to obtain 
the saddle point for the game. According to which, let 0x (first 
order derivative) be the solution of ( , ) 0a x A x
x
∂ = ∂
∂Then,    
( )
0
ln ln ln1 1,
ln 1
A
x m R
R
ϕ −− ϕ − ω= − =
− ϕ                    
(9) 
The probability with which the player decides an action 
A depends on the value of 0x . Now if 0 0( , ) ( , )a x a xΑ ≤ Β , 
then both attacker and defender would possess a pure optimal 
strategy, where 0x would be attacker’s strategy and A would 
be defender’s strategy. If 0 0( , ) ( , )a x a xΑ ≥ Β , only then the 
attacker has a pure optimal strategy x , given by Eqn (10).
( )
( )
( )
( )
1
1 1
m x
m x
x −
−
ϕ ϕ − ω − ω
=
ω − ϕ − ϕ
                                              (10)
On solving the Eqn (10) we obtain
( )
mx ω=
ϕ + ω                                                                   
(11)
The defender has a mixed optimal strategy of A and B. 
Now, let us adopt these concepts for our discrete 2 2× game 
matrix, by defining 1 0[ ]x x= and we obtain.
1 1
1 1
( , ) ( , )
( 1, ) ( 1, )
a x A a x B
a x A a x B
 
 + + 
                                          (12)
If 1 1( , ) ( , )a x a xΑ ≤ Β , we have pure strategy solutions for 
both the players otherwise only the attacker has a pure strategy 
solution while the defender has a mixed strategy solution.
It is observed that modelling the decisions using concepts 
of probability seems very convenient, however, in many 
realistic situations, real problems associated with human 
judgment about uncertainties and beliefs about adversaries 
cannot be modelled effectively using the probabilistic approach. 
We propose a belief functions framework as a methodology to 
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model the players’ behaviour and decision making.
5. moDellING the BehaVIour of PlayerS 
WIth uNcertaIN INformatIoN uSING 
BelIef frameWorK
In many practical situations, probability theory is not 
accepted as a suitable language of uncertainty. Probability 
estimation requires consistent, significant and non-conflicting 
data in sufficient quantity and behavioural observations of 
the individuals.  If this internal consistency is not met, equal 
probability is assigned to alternative states, resulting in random 
events. In real situations, decisions are modelled to arrive at 
different sets of alternatives, which is not possible under the 
probability framework. The expected utility under belief 
function gives an interval for the expected payoff instead of a 
single point estimate. under this approach, the decision maker 
takes a conservative approach and makes decisions based on 
the most unfavourable resolution of ambiguity.
In this section, as an evolutionary development of belief 
framework, behaviour of players is modelled by adding 
thinking, reasoning and logic planning engine (TR&lP Engine) 
with experience-weighed attraction (EWA) algorithm27.
The proposed algorithm based on EWA learning method 
processes all kinds of state information by logical thinking, then 
generates processed results to drive behavioural modelling by 
setting the parameters to adopt to the changing environment. 
This is done by accumulating new environment experience into 
the engine, which is what differentiates the belief framework 
from the traditional pre-programmed ones.
In view of the fact that the game formulation incorporates 
uncertain information sets of the computational players, they 
are required to make higher level of strategic thinking to update 
their beliefs with respect to the previous moves made by their 
opponents in order to make better moves and achieve higher 
expected values. This is represented as a tuple
, , i jt tT = Ρ Α π × π
where:
P= {Attackers i, Defender j}  is the set of players;
i jΑ = Α × Α , are the set of possible actions of the 
players;
i j
t tπ × π , Payoff functions for players andi j respectively, 
are such that ( )xt xaπ denotes the payoff of player x at time t
when he chooses action a according to the distribution a ∈ Α .
5.1 Player at level0-thinking (l0-t): Pre-Game 
thinking
At level0, each player x knows his own actions  xa , 
but is uncertain about the decisions of his opponent. As the 
game progresses, the players swap their turns in making their 
possible moves, which results in sequences of 0 1{ , , }a a 
.  After the initial move 0a has been made, the player who 
is supposed to make the next move ta decides whether to 
accept the move made by his opponent and withdraw from 
the game or to make a counter-move 1ta + . At this level, the 
player x constructs level0 beliefs
(0) : [0,1]xb Α → about the 
likelihood (0) ( )xb a that his decision will be accepted by his 
opponent. With these means, the player can estimate the value 
of continuing the game by making a move a , where he would 
randomly select a move *ta ∈ Α that would fetch him higher 
expected payoff.
* (0) (0)
(0) (0)
: ( , )
( ) ( ) (1 ( )) ( )
maxt x xa
x x
x x t x x t
a U a b
b a a b a a
∈Α
=
= × + − ×π π                
(13)
After the initial move of the game, the player decides on 
the action that he believes will fetch him a better outcome, 
according to the response function given below
1
* (0) * (0)
1
(0) * (0)
1
( )
If ( , ) ( )
accept If ( ) ( , )
withdraw Otherwise
K t
x
t x t x t x
x
t x i t i
L T a
a U a b a
a U a b
−
−
−
π
π
−
 >

= ≥

               
(14)
Equation (14) shows that if the player at 0L T− believes that 
the move *ta which he believes will fetch him a better expected 
payoff than either withdrawing from the game or accepting the 
move ( 1)ia t− − , player i will make a countermove 
*
ta to the 
move ( 1)ia t− − . On the other hand, if the player believes that 
the move *ta does not satisfy these conditions and might incur 
him a negative payoff, but accepting the move ( 1)ia t− − , will 
fetch him a better outcome than withdrawing from the game, 
the player accepts the move ( 1)ia t− − . In all other cases, the 
0L T− player withdraws from the game.  
5.2 Player at levelK- thinking KL T− : higher 
level thinking
The KL T− allows player x to judge his moves from the 
perception of his opponent in order to predict the opponents’ 
future moves. Provided with the uncertain information about 
his opponent, the player at KL T− forms beliefs about the 
decisions of his opponent with the confidence ( ) [0,1]Kc ∈ and 
player specific learning speed given by ( ) [0,1]Kλ ∈ . The other 
is experience weight ( )N t , equivalent to the observation of 
past experience with respect to present experience, ( 1)N t −  
multiplied by attenuation coefficient ϕ , added to an incremental 
value 1 , i.e., ( ) . ( 1) 1N t N t= ϕ − + . The player also constructs 
levelK beliefs 
( ) : [0,1]x
Kb Α → about the likelihood ( ) ( )Kxb a  
that his decision will be accepted by his opponent with the aid 
of feedback function ( )Kδ . Before the attack could progress, 
the player gets some reward of ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )KxK ib a U a× , which 
is the basic reward. After a successful attack (wherein his 
attacks go unnoticed by the defender), the attacker receives an 
additional payoff of ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 K Kx ib a U a− × . But if the attack 
is unfortunately a failure, then the player will not receive this 
additional payoff and will be left out with first part of the reward. 
If he has not planned any attack action at the given time step, 
due to which the network traffic is normal, then he receives 
a payoff ( ) ( )KiU a 0=  .In this way, each additional level of 
thinking allows the player to consider an additional model of 
opponent behaviour. Based on KL T− , the player formulates 
the expected value of making a move a ∈ Α combined with 
the expected payoff of other players at ( 1)KL T− −  according to
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( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
*
1
:
]
(
max
1 1 . ( 1)
[
[ ]
( )
[ ]
)
1
( )
K
t
K
xa A
K K K
x
K
x iK
a A
K K
x i
a U a
c N t U a
b a U a
N
N t
t
b a U a
N t
∈
−
∈
=
− × − λ × ϕ − ×
×
δ
− ×
=
+ +∑
           
(15)
This yields the following response function
1
* ( ) * ( )
1
(0) * ( )
1
( )
If ( , ) ( )
accept If ( ) ( , )
withdraw Otherwise
K t
K K x
t x t x t x
x K
t x i t i
L T a
a U a b a
a U a b
−
−
−
−
 >

=
π
π ≥

              
(16)
Belief theory builds in suitable principle that actions with 
higher expected payoff are chosen more often on the basis that, 
players ‘better respond’ rather than ‘best response’. This is 
done by relaxing the assumption that players choose the best 
action by incorporating the property that all actions are chosen 
with strict positive probability, calculated as follows
*
( ) *
( )
1
( )
( )
t
x x t
K
t x x
a A
K
x
K
U a
U K
θ
θ
=
µ =
∑
                                                     (17)
where *
x
t
a
µ is the probability of player ,x  selecting action
*
xa
and the parameter tθ controls the sensitivity of probability 
distribution to the expected value for each action.
5.3 learning from observations 
As KL T− players updates his beliefs, he also updates 
his confidence scores in higher level thinking ,Kc  to reflect 
the behaviour of his opponent at each level. This is achieved 
through
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
1
:
1
( )
1
1 .
. ( 1)
[ ]
( )
1
[ ]
( )
K K K K
K
x
K
x iK
a A
K K
K
x i
c c
N t U a
b a U a
N t
b a U a
N t
N t
−
∈
− λ λ
ϕ − ×
×
δ
= + ×
+
+ +
− ×
∑
           
(18)
In this way, the player updates his confidence level at each 
level of thinking that is expected to fetch him a better outcome 
to the move ( 1)ta − , made by the opponent and evaluated against 
the decision that the player himself would have made, if he had 
been a 1KL T− − player, in the situation of his opponent. 
6.  SImulatIoN aND aNalySIS
6.1 Dataset and the experimental environment
Basic datasets DARPA and KDDCuP99 is used for 
our testing, vulnerability analysis and feature selection. 
KDDCUP99 dataset is built on the traffic captured by DARPA, 
which have various intrusions. Each flow is characterised by 
41 parameters and labelled as normal or attack of a specific 
type, which includes denial of service (DoS) attack, user to 
root attack (u2R), remote to local attack (R2l), and probing 
attacks28.
Test-bed Simulation
Once the test-bed scenario of figs. 1 and 2  is setup, various 
cyber threat scenarios are created and executed by running the 
simulations. The time records of normal and abnormal traffic 
flow along with the indication of attack success and failure for 
the chosen attack type is depicted in the Table 1. for example 
time period between 15 to 19 signifies normal traffic, while 
that between 20 to 22 signifies traffic of attack data which 
the defender failed to identify, whereas the attack data at 
time 29 and 31 signifies the traffic that has been identified by 
the defender. By accumulating the history of network attack 
scenario, players decision making process under uncertainty 
has been studied using probability framework and belief 
function framework.
6.2 Vulnerability analysis of the Network System 
based on Probabilistic framework 
For the given test-bed setup, attack and normal flows 
are generated at each time instant. An important objective is 
to study the decision accuracy of choosing each action under 
uncertainty with probabilistic framework as depicted in fig. 3.
Decision accuracy is considered as correctly guessing 
which of the given options is better, such that it will yield an 
optimal solution. Combining a guess into a consensus decision 
through maximisation rule will result in decision accuracy 
within the range specified in Eqn (7).
figure 3. Decision accuracy for game under uncertainty using 
probabilistic framework.
6.2.1 Behavioural Analysis
Attackers explore the vulnerabilities of the network 
system to gradually gain privileges and exploit the system. 
Modelling a system which generates, analyses and generates 
recommendation strategies for security measures and interaction 
with the adverse environment lies in the effectiveness of the 
finite automaton it is built upon. A non-deterministic finite 
automaton is defined as ( , , , ),A S e C= π  where
S is a finite set of system states
π is a finite set of input sequence
e  is the exploit which measures the vulnerabilities and 
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is modelled as transition function: ( ),S P e× π → which is the 
probability of potential exploits.
C is the acceptance condition for the sequences of input 
string, iS , 0i∀ ≥ .
Accordingly, for any exploit measure ie , the probability 
( )iP e  uses access complexity (AC) metric29 which describes 
the computation of the described vulnerability as follows:
 
score=0.35, value=high(h)
( ) score=0.61, value=Medium(M)
score=0.71, value=low(l)
iP e




This metric measures the complexity of the attack 
required to exploit the vulnerability once the attacker has 
gained access to the target system. The lower the required 
complexity, the higher the vulnerability score. for the attack 
scenario setup discussed in section 4.1, a time point between 1 
and 2 recorded by the network sniffer indicates the attack type 
to be ‘Neptune’ which is a Dos attack. In this case, the affected 
configuration is highly vulnerable and is very rarely seen in 
practice, because the attacking team have elevated privileges 
and spoof additional system in addition to the attacking system. 
So the exploit measure for this type of attack is 0.35. The time 
point between 4 and 5 indicates the attack type to be probing 
in which the affected configuration is non-default and is not 
commonly configured. In this case since the attacking team is 
limited to a group of system at some level of authorisation, 
the vulnerability score is medium with the exploit measure 
0.61. The time point between 8 and 9 indicates R2l attack type 
wherein the affected configuration is default or ubiquitous and 
comparably less vulnerable with exploit measure 0.71. The 
time table of the respective attack types is shown in Table 2. 
for the negotiation game, let us assume 12 interactions 
between two sets of players (attacker and defender). Provided 
with the uncertain game environment, the attacker chooses 
over the attack types at each interaction. The attack types 
provided to the attacker during the game are: DDoS attack, 
probing attack and R2l attack. With the knowledge on the 
vulnerability levels and exploit measures of each of these 
attacks, the player selects the attacks with the confidence. On 
the other hand the defender decides whether to attack or not to 
attack. Thus for the given number of interactive sessions, the 
confidence score of the players is analysed for different attack 
and defence strategies according to Eqn (12). for example, if 
the attacker chooses the attack type ‘Neptune’ during the first 
interaction, then he succeeds in his attacks with the probability,
0.35ϕ = , if his attacks go undetected by the defender. But if 
the attack get detected by the defender, then the attacker runs 
a risk of 0.9δ = , then probability of succeeding in the attack 
is 0.035ω = . Similarly the game is  proceeded for, 12m =  
interactions and the confidence with which the players make 
decision under uncertainty about their opponents is depicted 
in fig. 4.
6.3 Vulnerability analysis of the Network System 
based on Belief framework
for the given test bed setup, time periods with normal 
traffic data and attack traffic date is captured using Wire Shark 
tool to study the players’ decision making process under 
uncertainty with belief framework. If the attacker’s previous 
moves have succeeded, then ( 1)b t −  is set to 1  , else it is set 
to 0 . But, since the decisions are made under uncertainty with 
no preferential biases, the probability of successful and failed 
actions is initially set to 0.5 along with the feedback function
δ and the coefficient λ , which signifies the player’s learning 
speed about his opponent.
With the above settings and test-bed setup, time periods 
with normal traffic data and attack traffic date is captured using 
Wires hark tool to study the players’ decision making process 
under uncertainty with belief framework. The expected payoff 
obtained by choosing an action x , at each time step as depicted 
in fig. 5. 
The probability of action x selected at each successive 
time strikes with varying levels of sensitivity increases over 
each trial as shown in fig. 6.
6.3.1  Confidence Analysis 
A negotiation game was modelled and simulated between 
two sets of players (attacker and defender) where each player 
was made to negotiate with either a 0L T− , 1L T− , 2L T−  or 
a 3L T−  player. The order in which the players encounter these 
different opponents is counterbalanced across the players. 
Since the game is a representation of imperfect information, the 
chance events at the initial stage of the game is programmed 
‘nature’s moves’, where the initiator was randomly decided. In 
consequent games, the players swapped in the role of initiator. 
The 0L T− , players were initialised by playing randomly 
figure 4. Behaviour analysis of players using probability 
framework.
figure 5. attacker’s expected payoff obtained for each attack 
action.
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generated games against an 0L T−  attacker player. At the start 
of each game, the player’s beliefs were reset to its initial state 
to compute the performance of the defenders
The moves of the players and his confidences Kc  in 
the KL T−  is observed and recorded accordingly. These 
confidences Kc  give insight in whether the behaviour of the 
players is more symptomatic of 0L T− , 1L T− , 2L T−  or a 
3L T− . for each level of thinking, fig. 7, shows how similar 
players moves were to the moves of each of the 0L T− , 1L T−
, 2L T−  or a 3L T− . purple points shows similarity of players 
moves to 0L T− , green points indicate similarity of players 
moves to 1L T−  and red and blue points show similarity to 
2L T−  and 3L T− . figure 7 also shows that players moves 
are more similar to 1L T− , 2L T−  and 3L T− than they are 
to 0L T−  . 
In this game, both 0L T− and 1L T−  players make 
moves that were believed to be accepted by their opponent. 
In contrast, 2L T− and 3L T− players tend to make decisions 
to alter the beliefs of their opponent. Due to which the early 
moves of 0L T− and 1L T− players were more favourable to 
their opponent and those made by 2L T− and 3L T− players, 
whose moves were favourable to themselves than their 
opponents. This signifies that, players make moves that are 
more consistent with 2L T− and 3L T− when their opponent 
is capable of 2L T− and 3L T− as well. Since the game is 
played under uncertainty, players had an understanding that 
they would confer with varying number of opponents, but 
they are unaware of their opponents with different KL T−
abilities. The results obtained from these experimental 
games confirm that players can benefit from the use of
KL T− .
7.  DIScuSSIoN aND coNcluSIoNS
National critical infrastructure is increasingly 
becoming a vulnerable asset in cyber-space. Training for 
risk assessment and mitigation requires the design and 
development of cyber warfare test-bed that models the 
attackers and defenders of such assets in cyberspace. In the 
present work, we model the behaviour of the players with 
incomplete and uncertain information and their decision 
making based probabilistic and belief frameworks. It is 
observed that the belief function model which uses higher 
level of thinking differs from the probabilistic models 
in that the behaviour of the player changes based on the 
observed behaviour of their opponents. We have investigated 
the interactions between the computational players under 
belief framework with higher level thinking can help in 
providing better framework to represent the uncertainties and 
thus obtaining better payoff instead of a single estimate as 
in probabilistic framework. In a negotiation experiment, we 
simulated interactions between the players and found that in 
contrast to strict probabilistic setting, reasoning using belief 
functions with higher level thinking helps to stabilise mutually 
beneficial interaction. In the belief setting, we let the players of 
different levels of thinking alternate to interact with each other 
under uncertainty. This represents the players’ the behaviour 
which helps in optimising one’s own behaviour. These results 
suggest that the belief framework which uses higher level 
thinking in computational players play a useful role in training 
the people in cyber war game setup to negotiate adversaries to 
expect better outcomes.
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